Weak and strong consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle are defined in terms of classical probability measure spaces. It 
The Abstract Principal Principle informally
The Abstract Principal Principle regulates probabilities representing the subjective degrees of belief p sub j (A) of an abstract Bayesian agent by stipulating that p sub j (A) are related to the objective probabilities p ob j (A) as p sub j (A| p ob j (A) = r ) = p ob j (A)
where p ob j (A) = r denotes the proposition "the objective probability, p ob j (A), of A is equal to r".
The formulation (1) of the Abstract Principal Principle presupposes that both p sub j and p ob j are probability measures: additive maps defined on a σ-algebra taking values in [0, 1] . p ob j is supposed to be defined on a σ-algebra S ob j of random events; and p sub j is supposed to be a map with a domain of definition being a σ-algebra S sub j .
It is crucial to realize that the σ-algebras S ob j and S sub j cannot be unrelated: for the 1 G. Bana, in his contribution to the symposium and to the present volume proved this conjecture. conditional probability p sub j (A| p ob j (A) = r ) in eq. (1) to be well-defined via Bayes' rule, the σ-algebra S sub j must contain both the σ-algebra S ob j of random events and with every random event A also the proposition p ob j (A) = r -otherwise the formula p sub j (A| p ob j (A) = r ) cannot be interpreted as an expression of conditional probability specified by Bayes' rule.
It is far from obvious however that, given any σ-algebra S ob j of random events with any probability measure p ob j on S ob j , there exists a σ-algebra S sub j meeting these algebraic requirements in such a way that a probability measure p sub j satisfying the condition (1) also exists on S sub j . If there exists a σ-algebra S * ob j of random events with a probability measure p * ob j giving the objective probabilities of events for which there exists no σ-algebra S sub j on which a probability function p sub j satisfying (1) can be defined, then the Abstract Principal Principle would be inconsistent as a general norm: In this case the agent, being in the epistemic situation of facing the objective facts represented by (S * ob j , p * ob j ), cannot have degrees of belief satisfying the Abstract Principal Principle for fundamental structural reasons inherent in the basic structure of classical probability theory. We say that the Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent if it is not inconsistent in the sense described. (The adjective "weakly" will be explained shortly.)
Remark 2.1. One can construe the Principal Principle differently: taking it as a norm that regulates internal consistency of the Agent. 2 Under this construal the subjective degrees of belief should satisfy
Here p ob j (A) = r is the proposition that the Agent believes that the objective probability of A is equal to r, and (2) requires that the Agent's subjective degrees of belief conditional on this belief should be equal to r -otherwise the Agent is inconsistent in his thinking. The difference between (1) and (2) is that r on the right hand side of (2) need not be equal to the real objective probability p ob j (A). The difference between these two interpretations plays no role however from the perspective of the consistency problem we investigate here:
Because of the universal quantification over p ob j in the consistency definitions and because of the universal quantification over r in (2) the two construals lead to the same consistency problem.
3 Weak and strong consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle (X, S, p) denotes a classical probability measure space, where S is a σ-algebra of (some) subsets of X and p is a probability measure on S. Given two σ-algebras S and S , the injective map h : S → S is a σ-algebra embedding if it preserves all Boolean-σ-operations.
The probability space (X , S , p ) is called an extension of (X, S, p) with respect to h if h is a σ-algebra embedding of S into S that preserves the probability measure p:
Definition 3.1. The Abstract Principal Principle is called weakly consistent if the following hold: Given any probability space (X ob j , S ob j , p ob j ), there exists a probability space (X sub j , S sub j , p sub j ) and a σ-algebra embedding h of S ob j into S sub j such that (i) For every A ∈ S ob j there exists an A ∈ S sub j with the property
(ii) If A, B ∈ S ob j and A = B then A = B .
Definition 3.1 says: Given the "objective" probability space (X ob j , S ob j , p ob j ), the σ-algebra S sub j in (X sub j , S sub j , p sub j ) contains the "copies" h(A) of all the random events A ∈ S ob j and also an element A to be interpreted as representing the proposition "the objective probability, p ob j (A), of A is equal to r" (this proposition we denoted by p ob j (A) = r ). If (iii) The probability space (X sub j , S sub j , p sub j ) is an extension of the probability space (X ob j , S ob j , p 0 sub j ) with respect to h; i.e. we have
The content of this additional requirement is that the agent's prior probability function p sub j restricted to the random events can be equal to probability measure p 0 sub j on S ob j that can differ from the objective probabilities of the random events given by p ob j . 
The Stable Abstract Principal Principle
Once the agent has adjusted his subjective degree of belief by conditionalizing, would be irrational to change his already correct degree of belief about A upon learning an additional truth, namely the value of the objective probability p ob j (B). So a rational agent's conditional subjective degrees of belief should be stable in the sense of satisfying the following condition:
If A and B are independent with respect to their objective probabilities
, then, if the conditional subjective degrees of belief are stable in the sense of (6), then (assuming the Abstract Principal Principle) one has
Equations (7) and (8)- (9) mean that if the conditional subjective degrees of belief are stable,
then, if A and B are objectively independent, then they (their isomorphic images h(A), h(B))
are also subjectively independent: independent also with respect to the probability measure that represents conditional subjective degrees of belief, where the condition is that the agent knows the objective probabilities of all of A, B and (A ∩ B). In this case the conditional subjective degrees of beliefs properly reflect the objective independence relations of random events -they are independence-faithful. Note that for the subjective degrees of belief to satisfy the independence-faithfulness condition expressed by eqs. (7) and (8)- (9), it is sufficient that stability (6) only holds for the restricted set of elements B in the σ-subalgebra S A,ind ob j of S ob j generated by the elements in S ob j that are independent of A with respect to p ob j .
This motivates to amend the Abstract Principal Principle by requiring stability of the subjective probabilities, resulting in the "Stable Abstract Principal Principle":
Stable Abstract Principal Principle The subjective probabilities p sub j (A) are related to the objective probabilities p ob j (A) as required by equation (1); furthermore, the subjective probability function is stable in the sense that the following holds:
If the subjective probability function is only independence-stable in the sense that (10) above holds for all B ∈ S A,ind ob j , then the corresponding Stable Abstract Principal Principle is called the Independence-Stable Abstract Principal Principle.
5 Is the Stable Abstract Principal Principle strongly consistent?
Definition 5.1. The Stable Abstract Principal Principle is defined to be weakly consistent if it is weakly consistent in the sense of Definition 3.1 and the subjective probability function p sub j is stable: it satisfies condition (10). The Independence-Stable Abstract Principal
Principle is defined to be weakly consistent if it is weakly consistent in the sense of Definition 3.1 and the subjective probability function p sub j is independence-stable: it satisfies (10) for all B ∈ S A,ind ob j .
Proposition 5.2. The Stable Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent.
The above proposition entails
Proposition 5.3. The Independence-Stable Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent.
Definition 5.4. The Stable Abstract Principal Principle is defined to be strongly consistent if it is strongly consistent in the sense of Definition 3.3 and the subjective probability function p sub j is stable. The Independence-Stable Abstract Principal principle is strongly consistent if it is strongly consistent in the sense of Definition 3.3 and the subjective probability function p sub j satisfies (10) for all B ∈ S A,ind ob j .
Problem 5.5. Is the (Independence-)Stable Abstract Principal Principle strongly consistent?
The problem of strong consistency of both the Stable and the Independence-Stable Abstract
Principal Principle remain open 3 .
6 Relation to other works Lewis (1986) introduced the term "Principal Principle" to refer to the principle linking subjective beliefs to chances. In the context of the Principal Principle p sub j (A) is called the "credence", Cr t (A), of the agent in event A at time t, p ob j (A) is the chance Ch t (A) of the event A at time t, and the Principal Principle is the stipulation that credences and chances are related as
where E is any admissible evidence the agent has at time t in addition to knowing the value of the chance of A.
Proposition Ch t (A) = r is clearly admissible evidence for (11), and, substituting E = Ch t (A) = r into equation (11), we obtain
which, at any given time t, is an instance of the Abstract Principal Principle if we make the identifications p ob j (A) = Ch t (A), p sub j (A) = Cr t (A). By Proposition 3.4 we know that, for any time parameter t, relation (12) is consistent with probability as measure.
If, however, admissibility of evidence E is defined in such a way that propositions stating the values of chances of other events B at time t (i.e. propositions of the form Ch t (B) = s ) are admitted as E, then (11) together with (12) entail that we also should have
The relation (13) together with equation (12) is, at any given time t, an instance of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle if we make the identifications p ob j (A) = Ch t (A), p sub j (A) = Cr t (A) and p ob j (B) = Ch t (B). Thus whether relations (13) and (12) 
This consistency expresses a simple but fundamental compatibility of the Principal
Principle with the basic structure of probability theory.
Lewis himself saw a consistency problem in his Principal Principle (he called it the "Big Bad Bug"): If A is an event in the future of t that has a non-zero chance r > 0 of happening at that later time but we have knowledge E about the future that entails that A will in fact not happen, E ⊂ A ⊥ , then substituting this E into (11) leads to contradiction if r > 0. Such an A is called an "unactualized future that undermines present chances" -hence the phrase "undermining" to refer to this situation. Since certain metaphysical arguments led Lewis to think that one is forced to admit such an evidence E, he tried to "debug" the Principal Principle (Lewis 1994) ; the same sort of debugging was proposed simultaneously by Hall (1994) and Thau (1994) . Other debugging attempts have followed (Black 1998 (11) with a value F(A) given by a function F different from the objective chance function (New Principle by Hall (1994) ; General Principal Principle by Lewis (1980) and by Roberts (2001) ).
(c) Modifying the Principal Principle by replacing the conditioning proposition
Ch t (A) = r ∩ E on the left hand side of (11) General Recipe by Ismael (2008) ).
To establish a theory of chance along a debugging strategy characterized by a combination of (a), (b) and (c), it is not enough to show however that undermining is avoided: one has to prove that the debugged Principal Principle is consistent in the sense of Definition 6.1 below, which is in the spirit of the notion consistency investigated in this paper:
Definition 6.1. We say that the "(A A ,C A , F)-debugged" Principal Principle is strongly consistent if the following hold:
Given any probability space (X ob j , S ob j , p ob j ) and another probability measure p 0 sub j on S ob j , there exists a probability space (X sub j , S sub j , p sub j ) and a σ-algebra embedding h of S ob j into S sub j such that (i) For every A ∈ S ob j the set A A is in S sub j , and for every A ∈ S ob j there exists a C A ∈ S sub j with the property
(ii) If A, B ∈ S ob j and A = B then C A = C B .
(iii) The probability space (X sub j , S sub j , p sub j ) is an extension of the probability space (X ob j , S ob j , p 0 sub j ) with respect to h; i.e. we have
(iv) For all A ∈ S ob j and for all B ∈ A A we have
We say that the "(A A ,C A , F)-debugged" Principal Principle is weakly consistent if (i), (ii) and (iv) hold.
Taking specific C A , and F, one obtains particular consistency definitions expressing the consistency of specific debugged Principal Principles. For instance, stipulations
yield Vranas' Conditional Principle (Vranas 2004, 370) ; whereas Hall's New Principle (Hall 1994, 511) can be obtained by
where H t,w is "the proposition that completely characterizes w's history up to time t" (Hall 1994, 506) and T w is the "proposition that completely characterizes the laws at w" (Hall 1994 , 506) (w being a possible world).
Proving consistency of the (A A ,C A , F)-debugged Principal Principles is necessary for the respective debugged Principal Principles to be compatible with measure theoretic probability theory. To our best knowledge such consistency proofs have not been given: it seems that this type of consistency is tacitly assumed in the works analyzing the modified Principal Principles, although, as the propositions and their proofs presented in this paper show, the truth of these types of consistency claims are far from obvious.
The problem of strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principle is also relevant from the perspective of existence of particular models of the axioms of higher order probability theory (HOP) suggested by Gaifman (1988) . If one regards the theory of HOP as an axiomatic theory, then the question arises whether models of the theory exist. Gaifman provides a few specific examples that are models of the axioms (Gaifman 1988, 208-10 The statement follows from Proposition 7.1 below if we make the following identifications:
Proposition 7.1. Let (X, S, p) be a probability space and letp be another probability measure on S such thatp is absolutely continuous with respect to p. Then there exists an extension (X , S , p ) of (X, S, p) with respect to the embedding h : S → S having the following properties:
(ii) A = B implies A = B Proof. We distinguish two cases: (i) the σ-algebra S is finite (ii) non-finite.
When S is finite, the proof consist of two steps. In the first step we choose an arbitrary element A ∈ S and construct an extension (X * , S * , p * ) of (X, S, p) with respect to an embedding h * in such a manner that in this extension this particular event A has a pair A = A * with the required properties. In step 2 we repeat this step n − 1 times, choosing each time another element from S until we exhaust S and obtain the extension (X , S , p ) of (X, S, p).
Step 1. Take any A ∈ S. We wish to construct a space (X * , S * , p * ) and a function h * : S → S * such that
• h * : (S , p) → (S * , p * ) is a measure preserving, injective Boolean algebra homomorphism.
• There is A * ∈ S * such that p * h * (A)|A * =p(A).
Let let (X 1 , S 1 ) and (X 2 , S 2 ) be two disjoint copes of (X, S), and fix the algebra
It is a routine task to verify that S * is a Boolean algebra of subsets of X * with respect to the usual set theoretical operations ∪, ∩, \ (below we also use the notation A ⊥ to refer to the set theoretical complement of an element A with respect to a set which is fixed by the context).
Define the map h * : S → S * by
h * is a homomorphism between S and S * .
Let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 be any number and define p * on S * by
For each A ∈ S we have then
Consequently, h * : (S , p) → (S * , p * ) is a measure preserving, injective Boolean algebra homomorphism.
For any fixed A ∈ S define A * by
Our aim now is to choose α in such a way that the following is true:
Some basic algebra shows that
Thus in order to satisfy (26) we have to choose α to guarantee
By assumption, if p(A) = 1 thenp(A) = 1, and thus any α = 0 makes (28) true. Similarly, if p(A) = 0, thenp(A) = 0, which means that any α = 1 will do. Also, ifp(A) = 0, then α = 0 will do. Therefore we may assume 0 < p(A) < 1 and 0 <p(A) ≤ 1. By re-ordering equation (28) and using the notation p = p(A), r =p(A) we obtain
To guarantee (28) we only have to show that α in equation (29) is between 0 and 1. Since 0 < p < 1 and 0 < r ≤ 1 we have rp < r and pr ≤ p. This means that both the numerator and the denominator of the fraction in (29) is negative, whence α is positive. On the other hand, we have
Thus 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 can always be chosen so that equation (26) holds.
Step 2. We obtain (X , S , p ) by iterating Step 1. Let A 1 , . . . , A n be an enumeration of S.
Applying
Step 1. with A 1 in place of A, one finds a space (X 1 , S 1 , p 1 ) = (X * , S * , p * ), an event A * 1 ∈ S 1 and an embedding h 1
Continuing in this way, we get elements h i−1 · · · h 1 (A i ) * ∈ S i and a chain of extensions
holds for all A i . Therefore we can complete the proof by letting
One has to verify that the extension in step j does not destroy the result of the previous one.
But this is a consequence of h j being an embedding that preserves the probability.
When the σ-algebra S is not finite, we take the extension (X , S , p ) to be the product space
where Then A ∈ S and one can verify easily that
It follows that if we choose α such that
then we get p h(A)|A =p(A)
That we can choose α to satisfy (32) is contained in the proof of the finite case.
Proof of weak consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal
Principle (Proposition 5.
2)
The statement of weak consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle follows from Proposition 7.2 below if we make the following identifications:
• (X ob j , S ob j , p ob j ) ↔ (X, S, p)
• (X sub j , S sub j , p sub j ) ↔ (X , S , p ) Proposition 7.2. Let (X, S, p) be a probability space. Then there exists an extension (X , S , p ) of (X, S, p) with respect to a σ-algebra homomorphism h : S → S such that 
Proof. Let (X, S, p) be a probability space and Y 0 be a set disjoint from S and having the same cardinality as the cardinality of S. We can think of Y 0 as having elements y A labeled by elements A ∈ S. Consider the set Y .
= Y 0 ∪ {y} = {y A : A ∈ S} ∪ {y} where y is an auxiliary element different from every y A . Take the powerset P (Y ) and let q be any probability measure on P (Y ) such that q({y}) = 0. Then (Y, P (Y ), q) is a probability space and we can form the product space (X , S , p ) = (X ×Y, S ⊗ P (Y ), p × q)
with p = (p × q) being the product measure on S ⊗ P (Y ). The map h : S → S defined by h(A) .
= A ×Y is an injective, measure preserving σ-algebra embedding. For each A ∈ S put
It is clear that (ii) in the proposition holds for A , B so defined. Utilizing that p is a product measure one can verify by explicit calculation that both (i) and (iii) hold.
